Events in Burma have featured regularly in the news over the last few months. Along with landmark elections, the release of Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest has guaranteed heavy coverage. To the casual observer it may appear that the notoriously guarded and oppressive military junta that controls the country has suddenly changed their course. To anyone familiar with the country’s history, skepticism is the more likely response.
The elections of Nov. 7 were Burma’s first in 20 years. The junta, in power since a 1962 coup, has presented the elections as a bold step toward democracy. Many opposition members, international organizations, and foreign governments, however, argue that both the structure and results of the election were rigged to protect military power. In the inaugural parliament, the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) controls more than 75 percent of the seats.
Suu Kyi, the leader of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) party, has been subject to two decades of near-continuous confinement. Her most recent release from house arrest, on Nov. 13, occurred just before the official results of the vote were known. Widespread and positive public reaction to her freedom has proven that she continues to hold considerable power and moral authority inside Burma, despite the fact that she was barred from standing in the elections. Her role in the political arena, and the military’s reaction to it, are being watched carefully as an indicator of the potential for reform.
These recent developments have provided many with hope that Burma is finally moving away from its long history as a pariah state with one of the worst human rights records in the world. However, the ultimate effect of the elections, and particularly whether they will create any latitude for significant reform, remains to be seen. Suu Kyi has been granted freedom before, only to be placed back into detention as soon as she becomes a political liability to the ruling generals. If the past actions of the junta are any indication, the election and amnesty may prove nothing more than a public relations ploy meant to distract from the continuing human rights crises within the country.
Background
The reality remains that Burma is one of the least developed and most corrupt countries in the world. The ruling military has systematically committed a long list of human rights abuses in its struggle to maintain power including arbitrary arrest and detention, extrajudicial killings, forced labor, recruitment of child soldiers, and torture.
Despite the brutal tactics used by the regime to stifle opposition and consolidate control, Burma remains an inefficiently governed, fragmented state. Although rich in natural resources and arable farmland, it is one of the poorest nations in Asia due in large part to the mismanagement and corruption of the ruling regime. International aid organizations are allowed only limited access to the country, exacerbating the existing food shortages and public health crises. Burma has more annual deaths from malaria than any other Southeast Asian country and has suffered HIV and tuberculosis epidemics worsened by a lack of health services for much of the population.
Conditions are particularly dire in the rural areas of the country, where the majority of the population reside. Many outlying areas are partially controlled by ethnic minority groups who are frequently targeted by the military. Some of these groups manage a degree of autonomy and an uneasy peace with the junta. Others live as internally displaced peoples, on the run from military raids and the threat of forced labor. Hundreds of thousands of refugees have fled into neighboring countries.
In May 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck the southwestern region of the country, killing as many as 200,000 people and destroying homes and vital crops. Always fearful of outside influence, the government blocked most international aid groups from operating inside the country. The military’s own response to the disaster was so ineffective and plagued with graft that some international organizations called on the International Criminal Court to investigate for possible crimes against humanity.
Although the government was apparently unable to provide basic services to citizens who were living without food or shelter, it was eager to continue with a planned constitutional referendum held just days after the disaster. Both the timing and integrity of the referendum were widely criticized, as was the new constitution. As part of the so-called “roadmap to democracy,” it established a new election process and “democratic” parliamentary structure that guarantees the military continued power.
While the junta has made democratic overtures in the past, it has always returned to its practices of political oppression and totalitarian rule. Elections held in 1990 resulted in a landslide victory for the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) party and were promptly nullified. Many of the Burmese citizens who worked with the NLD during that period now number among the thousands of Burmese political prisoners, or have been forced to flee the country in the years since the elections.
Suu Kyi is one such citizen. The daughter of Aung San, the martyred architect of Burma’s independence from Britain, she led the NLD to its 1990 election victory despite being placed under house arrest in 1989. Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 for her “non-violent struggle for democracy and human rights,” Suu Kyi’s detention continued until 1995 when she was released conditionally, with restrictions placed on internal and external travel.
She was arrested again in 2000 for two years and, following a failed assassination attempt in 2003 by government-paid thugs, was placed back into detention until her most recent release. Suu Kyi continues to inspire the Burmese democracy movement despite her harrowing record of detention. Her ordeal serves as a prime example of the military’s duplicitous attempts to lessen international pressure while continuing its totalitarian practices.
Recent Events
Many believe that the latest election and amnesty is yet another episode in this pattern of feigned reform. In recent years, Burma has increased its economic ties with China, Thailand, India, and a number of other states. The lessening of international pressure and economic sanctions could mean a huge influx of investment, benefiting the generals and their allies.
The junta has tried its best to assert the fairness of the recent elections. State-run media such as the New Light of Myanmar and TV Myanmar International provided a range of stories on the elections, from the mundane, “Maj-Gen Tin Ngwe of Ministry of Defence and wife cast votes,” to the misleading “Diplomats, journalists observe casting votes in Haka and Falam.” In reality, the junta refused entry to international election observers and, while there were a few foreign diplomats present (notably, a group from North Korea), they did not provide serve any significant role in monitoring the elections.
Reports from independent Burmese observers, however, indicated widespread voter intimidation. Bribery and other abuses—such as the military taking advantage of advance voting by forcing whole units of soldiers and their families to vote in blocs—were also alleged. This, in addition to the fact that the new constitution guarantees 25 percent of parliamentary seats to military representatives, limits the activities of political opposition groups, and dictates that the president of the country, who is not elected, must be a current or former member of the military.
For these reasons, many civil society groups and political organizations, including Suu Kyi’s, boycotted the elections as part of a larger strategy of actively opposing the regime’s roadmap.
This boycott strategy was roundly supported by the exiled pro-democracy movement according to Jenny Hedstrom, a Swedish consultant currently on the Thai-Burma border who stated, “The exile groups don’t trust the military at all, and strongly believe the election was solely a charade to make the Burmese junta look legitimate in international eyes.”
That charade seems to have failed. Many in the international community, including President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron have joined pro-democracy and human rights groups in condemning the elections as a “sham” designed to mislead the international community and add an air of legitimacy to the regime. Groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have been highly critical of the junta’s roadmap at every turn.
Considering the structure and administration of the elections, the final results announced on Nov. 18 surprised no one. Pro-regime parties won 946 of the 1,154 seats up for election, not counting the 25 percent of seats already guaranteed to the military. Opposition parties won less than 9 percent of the total seats.
During the period between the election and the announcement of the final results, the junta released Suu Kyi from house arrest. Additionally, her youngest son has finally been allowed to visit her, after having been denied a visa to Burma for 10 years. While pro-democracy groups are overjoyed at Suu Kyi’s release, they are also cautious in their optimism, worrying that she will eventually be taken back into custody. Caution does not seem to be the foremost concern of Suu Kyi who, since her release, has continued to speak out for non-violent revolution in Burma, saying “I think of revolution as significant change. I say this because we are in need of significant change,” while criticizing the military’s illusory approach to reform.
What Now?
One change that has taken hold recently in Burma is the foundation of numerous civil society groups working for social reform within the country. Made up of private citizens and businessmen, and sometimes associated with the ruling regime, the groups first became visible as self-help apparatuses after Cyclone Nargis and are now working on a number of domestic issues. Representatives of some groups argue that the recent election, although biased, signifies growing room for civil action.
Mindful of the reality on the ground, and with the hope that they will face fewer restrictions in the post-election environment, several of these groups are prepared to continue testing the boundaries of freedom inside the country. A senior consultant working with a group based in Rangoon posited that “as long as one does not touch direct politics, one is pretty much free to do what one wants, in particular in the fields of education or humanitarian aid.”
The pro-democracy movement is skeptical, however, and continues to place their faith in the international community and international law. They have most recently lobbied United Nations member states to support the UN human rights monitor to Burma, Tomás Quintana, in his call for a commission of inquiry to investigate the widely documented human rights abuses and war crimes committed by the regime. HRW has also been a strong supporter of the commission of inquiry, which could be seen as a possible road to reconciliation between the junta, pro-democracy activists and ethnic minority groups.
These ethnic groups, who maintain control in many border areas, have begun to organize their forces for the possibility of renewed confrontation with the regime. Mindful of the crackdowns that have occurred after past elections, they feel it is necessary to be prepared. There are reports that high-level meetings have taken place in Thailand during the last few weeks concerning strategic cooperation between several of these groups.
Regardless of the strategic intentions behind recent events, the fact remains that there is a long and difficult road to traverse before Burma can celebrate the result of a truly democratic election. Suu Kyi has, since her release, stated a willingness to work with all actors who are prepared to enter a real dialogue about the democratic future of Burma. Short of international imposition or active rebellion, we can only hope that there are actors in the military regime with the same willingness.
A version of this article appeared in print in the December 2010 issue of the Bridge.
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