Monday, November 28, 2011

Fighting Terror with Terror in Afghanistan

Fighting Terror with Terror in Afghanistan
Ryan O’Connor ’14

On October 10th, 2011, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, or UNAMA, released a report documenting the torture of hundreds of detainees in several detention facilities and jails run by the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Afghan National Police (ANP) across the war-torn nation. The study found that of the 273 conflict-related detainees held by NDS, 125, (46 percent) experienced torture, as defined under international law. Additionally, 41 (35 percent) of the 117 detainees held by the ANP experienced torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.[1] The report will only embolden the disposition of the now 62 percent of Americans who believe President Obama should lower troop presence in Afghanistan, and the 50 percent of Americans who believe the war has not been a success.[2] Irrespective of this public policy debate, lies a legal issue of great importance that could affect the United States’ involvement in Afghanistan.

At the National Directorate of Security facilities, the claims of torture by prisoners were specific and consistent enough to enable UNAMA to validate their legitimacy. UNAMA’s report on torture states,

The forms of abuse most commonly reported were suspension (being hung by the wrists from chains attached to the wall, iron bars or other fixtures for lengthy periods) and beating, especially with rubber hoses, electric cables and wires or wooden sticks and particularly on the soles of the feet. Other forms of abuse reported included electric shock, twisting of the detainee’s penis and wrenching of the detainee’s testicles, removal of toenails and forced prolonged standing.[3]

This torture was known to have taken place at five different NDS facilities, as well as the NDS Counter-Terrorism Department in Kabul.[4] One detainee, referred to as Detainee 371, expounded on the torture tactics he received, saying that he was told by an interrogator, “[y]ou should confess to what you have done in the past as Taliban; even stones confess here.”[5] This quote fittingly, if menacingly, sums up the dire straits human rights advocates face in Afghanistan. Despite significant international intervention, the West’s, and specifically the U.S.’s desire to have an international-law-abiding Afghan partner has not come to fruition.

The release of the U.N. report has given the United States a subtler cause for concern, dating back to past Congressional legislation. The Leahy Law, a provision found in the United States Senate’s 2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, states:

None of the funds made available by this Act may be provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.[6]

The Defense Appropriations Act also includes a similar position, albeit affording the responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense, not the Secretary of State. The implications the Leahy Law could have on the United States’ funding of the Afghan NDS and ANP cannot be understated. First, UNAMA undoubtedly qualifies as a credible source to be relied upon under the Leahy doctrine. Further, the evidence the agency provided, if true, would prove the existence of gross violations of human rights under international law. Assuming these two statements to be true, one can paint an awkward picture of Secretary of State Clinton, or Secretary of Defense Panetta vouching for Hamid Karzai’s government before the Committee on Appropriations on Capital Hill. Given the growing tensions between Afghan and American governments, the growing bipartisan disdain for the Afghan War in Congress, as well as the national consensus to bring the troops home, such a scenario seems unlikely given the foreseeably vitriolic reaction the Administration would receive from the public at large.

Yet, despite the requisite demonstration of faith in the Afghan government needed by the American government, it is highly unlikely that the Administration would simply stop funding the NDS and ANP. The Obama administration, while cognizant of the at-times contentious relations between the U.S. and Afghan government, also values a U.S. presence on the ground in Afghanistan as a stabilizing force in the country. Yet, the requirements set forth by the Leahy Law seem exceedingly relevant to the situation at hand. And so, throughout the next few months the American government’s response to the alleged torture in Afghanistan should be indicative of how seriously they view the Leahy Law. Does the Obama Administration sweep the alleged torture under the rug, further pushing the Leahy Law into irrelevancy? Or do they acknowledge the issue and make a point to come out on one side or the other?

While the documented torture in Afghanistan facilities was systematic, this network of human rights violations did not necessarily originate in the higher echelons of the Afghani government. In fact, “UNAMA’s findings indicate that mistreatment is not an institutional or Government policy,” said Staffan de Mistura, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan.[7] Essentially, while torture may be promoted, even instituted, by certain government facilities, it is not the Afghani Government’s official policy. Ostensibly, this may appear to be good news. However, this lack of cohesion throughout the government speaks to the central dilemma facing the Afghani Security Agencies—a lack of accountability and oversight. Even still, the U.S. will continue to invest resources into the Afghani security agencies without a vivid picture as to where exactly this money will end up. Yet, the Leahy Law remains. While the notion may seem far less than ideal to Administration officials, it may be necessary for President Obama to instruct his Secretaries of State and Defense to personally vouch for the human rights policy of Hamid Karzai’s administration before Congress. On that day, it may be worth flipping the channel over to C-SPAN to hear what the Administration has to say.

[1] Treatment of Conflict­Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/October10_%202011_UNAMA_Detention_Full-Report_ENG.pdf
[2] Alex Sundby, Poll: Half of the U.S. says Afghan War Not a Success (October 3, 2011, 7:40 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20114666-503544.html
[3] Treatment of Conflict­Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, page 16
[4] page 16
[5] page 1
[6] http://www.ciponline.org/facts/leahy.htm
[7] http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Press%20Releases/Oct10_%202011_UNAMA_Detention_Report_ENG.pdf


No comments:

Post a Comment